“Should pharmaceutical companies be allowed to enforce patent rights on their COVID-19 vaccines?” from Law and Economics Perspective

 

Amongst the fight against the life-threatening COVID-19 pandemic, the question arises whether or not pharmaceutical companies must be granted exclusive patent rights for their COVID-19 vaccines. Although certain scholars and health professionals argue that Intellectual Property (IP) rights should not be exercised for the COVID-19 vaccines in order to overcome the pandemic, our law and economics analysis shows that the pharmaceutical companies which develop such vaccines should be allowed to enforce patent rights over their products.

Firstly, waiving the IP rights will stifle future innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, granting IP protection to patent owners is designed to trigger competition in the said industry and facilitate the pharmaceutical companies to invest their time and monies in the Research and Development (R&D) of new drugs. Hence, no such companies would be interested in developing effective COVID-19 vaccines in such a short timeframe if they were not promised to receive the patent protection along with the anticipated return of their investments.

However, some critics claim that the patent rights for COVID-19 vaccines must be set aside to achieve larger vaccination among the population and to overcome the economic downturns accompanying the pandemic. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the COVID-19 pandemic is neither the first nor the last pandemic humanity encounter. Therefore, if those companies are not granted patent rights for their invention, they may show less incentive in developing new vaccines to combat diseases in the future posing more disruption into the global economy in the long run.

Although it can be argued that granting patent rights to those companies may lead to potential monopoly and overpricing of the injections, the fact that the vaccines developed by seven companies have been approved and there are 251 COVID-19 vaccine projects underway around the world, including 70 are in clinical trials, with 16 in the most advanced phase of testing[1] leaves no room for concerns about monopoly.  The imminent competition will ensure the competitive price for vaccines that will enable the public at large to access affordable vaccines.

Finally, the patent, at any extent, should not be regarded as a barrier to the production of COVID-19 vaccines which shall meet the global demand, as opponents claim. The provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration already offer certain flexibilities in regulation of patent rights allowing states to manufacture the generic versions of vaccines through compulsory licensing in public health emergencies. Thus, this is a win-win situation since it gives access to the vaccines to those in need and provides royalty to the patent owners to keep them on track to continue to invest in the R&D. However, implementation of compulsory licensing itself requires the grant of patent rights first.

In sum, the patent suspension may lead to economic repercussions by disrupting future pharmaceutical inventions, while its existence in contrast constitutes a solution to distributing COVID-19 vaccines in a time-efficient way and at an affordable price worldwide.

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[1] WHO Publication: Draft landscape and tracker of COVID-19 candidate vaccines, 22 February 2021, available at https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/draft-landscape-of-covid-19-candidate-vaccines

An Economic Analysis of IP Law

SDG 9 aims to foster innovation besides building resilient infrastructure and promote sustainable industrialization. An effective Intellectual Property (hereinafter referred to as "IP") legal framework is the cornerstone of the innovation policy of any country in order to encourage companies to invest in the Research and Development (R&D) of knowledge creation and innovations. This paper aims to discuss such a legal framework fostering innovation from a Law and Economics perspective.

Considering research, development and innovation are expensive processes, businesses must be stimulated to innovate. Companies are generally engaged in the Research and Development of new business innovations for getting ahead of their competitors. Therefore, it is noteworthy to mention that the results of such innovations will give a considerable advantage to the company only if its rivals have no free access to the said knowledge or inventions. Hence, it is essential to guarantee that the Intellectual Property of these endeavors will not be accessible to their competitors. This inaccessibility is ensured by the IP policy that introduces exclusive rights to the intellectual property created by the company which restricts access to such business innovations by others, thus offers the possibility of a return on investment. In the absence of adequate protection, the competitors would freely use the result of R&D and subsequently, businesses would have no incentive to invest in research, development and innovation. This would have detrimental effects on the technological progress and economy of any country.

However, an overprotected IP system may also have a negative impact on the economy. By providing exclusive rights to the author of innovation, the IP system establishes a monopoly on such knowledge and innovation. The owner of business innovation prevents other companies from producing the same product and entering the market during the granted period of exclusive rights. Eventually, IP rights as patents, copyrights, licenses, trademarks, etc., provide a monopoly for companies and create obstacles to entry in the industry, restricting competition and favoring monopoly situations. As a result, companies holding exclusive IP rights may increase and reduce production, sales, and also generate higher monopoly prices for consumers. Thus, the superior position of the exclusive IP rights holder may cause the disruption of the market economy and lead to the monopoly.

The resolution of this conflict can be the introduction of an alternative IP policy to reward the authors of IP in the form of direct or indirect government subsidies and granting limited proprietary rights over their intellectual results. Such a system enables both incentives for the creators to be motivated to continue to invest in R&D and the access to those innovations for the benefit of the society in the meantime: the author of IP is remunerated for the cost of creation and as there is no exclusive right to exclude others, the competition will bring the price down to marginal cost. To exemplify this policy, according to WIPO, Serbian the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development provides special grants to support innovative projects implemented by SMEs.

In conclusion, Law and Economics perspective shows that the IP policy fostering innovation can have either positive or negative effect on economic development: a weak protection system will reduce innovation due to the lack of an adequate return on investment; the severe system will reduce the dissemination of innovative results and lead to the monopoly on their use. In contrast, an alternative reward-based system not only offers the remuneration for innovations to be continued, but also society benefits from such inventions at an affordable price.

The economic effects of WTO membership for Azerbaijan

WTO was established with the objective of economic development by ensuring the free flow of trade among its members.[1] However, some argue that the WTO model does not guarantee gains for everyone, rather developed countries have more opportunities to take in the wealth of the planet through this “club”.[2]  Because Azerbaijan is in the accession process to WTO,[3] therefore we will analyze based on our national experience what benefits and drawbacks WTO accession implies for Azerbaijan as a developing economy and considering them is it worth becoming a WTO member after all?

            On one hand, the WTO membership requires large-scale reforms to be implemented in several fields of regulation, intellectual property and investments[4] which could facilitate trade inflow, economic growth, and foreign investment.[5] Take the example of arbitration legislation, according to the Doing Business report of the World Bank,[6] domestic arbitration is not permitted in Azerbaijan.[7] The decisions of the Supreme Court on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards also lack uniformity and stability mainly due to conflicting norms of the Civil Procedural Code and the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on International Arbitration.[8] Being aware of this unpredictability, foreign investors are hesitant to invest in Azerbaijan which increases the dependence of the economy upon the sale of oil, while other sectors remain undeveloped. Apparently, the harmonization of national legislation to WTO provisions and establishing a more investor-friendly climate in the country will increase Foreign Direct Investments (“FDIs”) in the different sectors of the economy.[9] WTO regulations will also neutralize the country-wide  illegal monopolistic conducts of oligarchs and technocrats of the government.[10] Under applied regime, the ordinary citizens will also benefit the dropping prices, increasing quality of the market economy.

            On the other hand, WTO membership will have detrimental macroeconomic effects for the local business sectors of Azerbaijan.[11] The agricultural field is a perfect example of a potential downturn.[12] Given that Azerbaijan has a massive amount of agricultural production,[13] the sector employs 40% of the productive workforce of the country,[14] and contributes 6% of the state GDP,[15] agriculture is the most important non-oil field for the country.[16] In lieu of fragile oil prices, Azerbaijan also aims for economic diversification from oil to agriculture.[17] However, agricultural sector too has its own weaknesses that without government support, it is difficult to achieve an improvement in productivity, quality and competitiveness.[18] Hence, Azerbaijani government regularly supports the agricultural sector by subsidies to local producers and imposing higher tariffs on imported agricultural products. On contrary, WTO requires Azerbaijan to cut its tariffs on agricultural goods and permits state subsidies merely for carrying out research, improving infrastructure and establishing irrigation systems.[19] Currently, the Azerbaijani subsidy rate in agriculture ranges between 15-20 percent, nevertheless WTO’s demand is to modify the range to 5-10 percent.[20] Similarly, on imports of agriculture products grown in the country, Azerbaijan proposes higher bound tariffs between 30-50% to be imposed contrary to WTO standards.[21] Pursuing WTO requirements on trade liberalization and removing state intervention on the market will leave weak local firms alone in a fiercely competitive environment with global oligopolies within the WTO framework[22] before reaching adequate quality, production and competitiveness.[23] Subsequently, under this imperfect competition, foreign products would wipe out the domestic goods from the market.[24] Not only agriculture but also other progressive but volatile domestic sectors are not  capable of competing with their foreign rivals.[25] Moreover, the reduced tariff regime will cause the loss of confidence among local entrepreneurs in the non-oil sector, while the importation of certain goods and services will accrue to the detriment of local industries that are deprived of government safeguard.[26]

            To sum all up, Azerbaijan has two options either to participate in the globalization process through WTO membership where the 90% of world trade is going on or to stay away from this framework to protect its private sectors. Azerbaijan however must take into consideration the realities of today’s world. WTO membership will increase its trade partners and lead to diversification and market economy through liberalization and openness. Dependence on natural resources is not much promising since the oil and gas prices are fluctuating and they are not forever inexhaustible.  Thus, if Azerbaijan succeeds to join the organization as a developing country status with a longer transitional period for subsidies and tariff concessions on primarily important domestic sectors, it will lead to considerable economic growth in the long term.

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[1] Huseynov, Rashad, Welfare and Economy-Wide Effects of Azerbaijan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: A Quantitative Assessment. Bonn, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany: Institute for Food and Resource Economics. At 8. (15 January 2015).

[2] Guzman, A. T. (2004). Global Governance and the WTO. Harvard International Law Journal, 45(2), 303-351.

[3] Bayramov, V. (2010). The pros and cons of WTO membership for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan in the World: http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol_3_no_4/The_pros_and_cons_of_WTO_membership_for_Azerbaijan.htm?print=1

[4] Ismayilova, A. (2007). The World Trade Organization and Azerbaijan: The past, present and the future. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 9-10.

[5] Bayramov, V. (2010). Azerbaijan’s Accession to World Trade Organization (WTO); Pros and Cons. The Center for Economic and Social Development, page. 3-36. Bayramov, V. (2010). The pros and cons of WTO membership for Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan in the World: http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol_3_no_4/The_pros_and_cons_of_WTO_membership_for_Azerbaijan.htm?print=1

[6] https://www.doingbusiness.org/

[7] Decision of the Baku Court of Appeals No.2-1(103)-376/2014 dated July 31, 2014

[8] Ruslan Mirzayev, Legislation and Practice of Commercial Arbitration in Azerbaijan, April 3, 2019, available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/04/03/legislation-and-practice-of-commercial-arbitration-in-azerbaijan/

[9] Aliyev, K. (20 February 2014). Expected Macroeconomic Impacts of the Accession to WTO on Azerbaijan Economy: Empirical Analysis. Gazimağusa, North Cyprus: Munich Personal RePEc Archive

[10] Bayramov, V. (2010). Azerbaijan’s Accession to World Trade Organization (WTO); Pros and Cons. The Center for Economic and Social Development, page. 3-36.

[11] Aliyev, K. (20 February 2014). Expected Macroeconomic Impacts of the Accession to WTO on Azerbaijan Economy: Empirical Analysis. Gazimağusa, North Cyprus: Munich Personal RePEc Archive

[12] Farhat, F. Y. (2007). Azerbaijan and the WTO: Challenges and opportunities. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 12-16.

[13] Mamed-Guliyev, M. (01 December 2007). Interview: Accession to the WTO. (A. Ismayilova, Interviewer) American Chamber of Commerce in Azerbaijan.

[14] Farhat, F. Y. (2007). Azerbaijan and the WTO: Challenges and opportunities. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 12-16.

[15] Huseynov, R. (15 January 2015). Welfare and Economy-Wide Effects of Azerbaijan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: A Quantitative Assessment. Bonn, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany: Institute for Food and Resource Economics

[16] Aliyev, K. (20 February 2014). Expected Macroeconomic Impacts of the Accession to WTO on Azerbaijan Economy: Empirical Analysis. Gazimağusa, North Cyprus: Munich Personal RePEc Archive.

[17] Huseynov, R. (15 January 2015). Welfare and Economy-Wide Effects of Azerbaijan’s Accession to the World Trade Organization: A Quantitative Assessment. Bonn, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany: Institute for Food and Resource Economics

[18] Ismayilova, A. (2007). The World Trade Organization and Azerbaijan: The past, present and the future. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 9-10.

[19] Mamed-Guliyev, M. (01 December 2007). Interview: Accession to the WTO. (A. Ismayilova, Interviewer) American Chamber of Commerce in Azerbaijan.

[20] Mamed-Guliyev, M. (01 December 2007). Interview: Accession to the WTO. (A. Ismayilova, Interviewer) American Chamber of Commerce in Azerbaijan.

[21] Aliyev, K. (20 February 2014). Expected Macroeconomic Impacts of the Accession to WTO on Azerbaijan Economy: Empirical Analysis. Gazimağusa, North Cyprus: Munich Personal RePEc Archive

[22] Gallagher, K. P. (February 2008). Understanding developing country resistance to the Doha Round. Review of International Political Economy, 15(1), 62-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25261955

[23] Gallagher, K. P. (February 2008). Understanding developing country resistance to the Doha Round. Review of International Political Economy, 15(1), 62-85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25261955

[24] Kourmanova, A. (02 July 2015). Kazakhstan and the WTO: A New Era. Center for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/kazakhstan-and-wto-new-era

[25] Ismayilova, A. (2007). The World Trade Organization and Azerbaijan: The past, present and the future. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 9-10.

[26] Ismayilova, A. (2007). The World Trade Organization and Azerbaijan: The past, present and the future. Impact Azerbaijan (1), 9-10.

An Alternative Way To Combat "Online Piracy"

 

As Matthew C. Mousley said, "digital piracy is clearly a constant menace to the entertainment industry."[1] According to the International Chamber of Commerce, the movie industry suffered as much as $160 billion[2] and the recording industry also made $29 billion in losses worldwide in 2015 due to online piracy.[3] These all show that the copyright owners of such artistic works should be protected by successful digital antipiracy measures against illegal downloading and peer-to-peer file sharing.[4] Accordingly, this paper aims to discuss the potential solution to adequately combat online piracy, its effectiveness, fairness, and the comparison with the available domestic measures.

            Before proceeding to the proposed measure, it is noteworthy mentioning what Azerbaijani legislation currently has in its arsenal to combat piracy. Unfortunately, “The Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Enforcement of the IP rights and fight against piracy”[5] does not contain any provision specifically regulating digital piracy and there has not been any other attempt to adopt specific measures in this regard to the present. Therefore, we also believe the proposed solution below can also be a good starting point for digital antipiracy policy of Azerbaijan.

One of the successful tactics to combat online copyright infringement is the graduated response method[6] which has been put into practice in some jurisdictions[7] such as the US,[8] South Korea,[9] and France.[10] This system basically alerts the users when they illegally engage in file-sharing on the internet.[11] The conventional version of the graduated response method is comprised of several warnings starting from educational notification and ending with cutting off user’s internet access.[12] This method has drawn criticism from a number of organizations[13] and politicians[14] on the concerns of Internet disconnection,[15] free speech[16] and the erosion of due process.[17] Thus, the Author suggests some modifications to be made for the adoption of an effective and fair solution for the benefit of internet users, copyright owners, and Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”).

            The modified version of the graduated response method will impose the fee-charging following the educational warnings. As soon as the copyright owners realize the illegal content sharing on the Internet, they notify the ISPs which then will issue consecutive warnings to the infringer. The first warning aims to raise the user’s awareness of the copyright violation while the second warning informs the user about the file-sharing fee if he/she continues his/her infringing activity. In each instance of illegal downloading, the infringer is charged the graduating fees which can be determined by ISPs in collaboration with the relevant industries. Most of the collected money is then transferred to the content owners to compensate for their losses incurred from illegal downloading. The charged fees will be added to the user’s internet bill and similar to the appealing contested credit card charge, the users should be granted the right to appeal their Internet bill before it is due. The relevant IP offices may also be involved in this process for scrutiny purposes.

This proposed system is superior to the current version. Firstly, it does not impede upon the users’ freedom of expression by cutting off their internet access which is nowadays the major way to connect with the world[18] and provides the user the due process against technical errors. Further, an educative notification mechanism for alleged online infringers is essential[19] since many users are often unaware of what they are doing is illegal.[20] This also helps unknowing consumers avoid larger potential copyright infringement fines.[21]

A graduated response system also helps copyright holders by avoiding the negativity[22] of initiating a mass-litigation campaign against the infringer end-users including children,[23] single mothers,[24] and the deceased,[25] as happened in the past.[26] These lawsuits did not result in considerable compensations to copyright holders,[27] as the litigation costs[28] usually exceeded the money recovered.[29] In contrast, the proposed solution ensures passing predetermined fees to content owners as if their works have been acquired by legal means.

The graduated response method also brings benefits for ISPs by shielding them against costly lawsuits brought by content owners as a result of individual copyright infringements by its users.[30] It also alleviates ISPs not to fear for their users’ conduct and spy on them instead of focusing on improvement of their system.[31]

In sum, the above-outlined system is effective because it will charge the infringer a sum of money for infringement and put proceeds back in the copyright holder's account to stimulate them to invest their time and energy in creating future artistic and literary works. Moreover, since it also allocates the responsibility for copyrighted contents among copyright holders, ISPs and Internet users, the new version of the graduated response system is, therefore, a highly fair solution.

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[1] Matthew C. Mousley, Peer-to-Peer Combat: The Entertainment Industry's Arsenal in its War on Digital Piracy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 667, 695 (2003).

[2] Igor Slabykh, The New Approaches to Digital Anti-Piracy in the Entertainment Industry, 19 UIC REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 75 (2019).

[3] Frontier Economics Ltd., The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy, Int'l Chamber of Com. 28 (2016), https://cdn.iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/IC C-BAS CAPFrontier-report-2016.pdf.

[4] Nelson Granados, How Piracy is Still Hurting the Filmmakers and Artists You Admire, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:08 PM); Zachary Charles Fritts Landy, 'Combatting Online Piracy: A Case Study on Popcorn Time and Revising Available Remedies to Copyright Holders' (2016) 24(1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 221.

[5] Available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/az/az100en.pdf

[6]Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable, 13 VND. J. ENT. &TEcH. L. 695, 727 (2011); Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy: as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, I WIPO J. 75, 77-80 (2009).

[7] Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement: A Non-Neutral Role for Network Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375 (2009).

[8]Anthony Cuthbertson, Proxy Websites for Pirate Bay, Kickass Torrents and more disappear in ProxyHouse Blitz, INT'L BUS. TIM's (Oct. 13, 2015, 12:08 BST); Nate Anderson, RIAA Graduated Response Plan: Q&A with Cary Sherman, ARs TECHNICA, Dec. 21, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/12/riaa-graduated-responseplan-qa-with-cary-sherman.ars; Steve Knopper, RIAA's Gaze Turns from Users to ISPs in Piracy Fight, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/14844/94542.

[9] Giblin, Rebecca. "Evaluating Graduated Response." Korea University Law Review, 18, 2015, p. 108.

[10] Peter K. Yu, "The Graduated Response," Florida Law Review 62, no. 5 (January 2010): 1376.

[11] Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, I WIPO J. 75, 77-80 (2009).

[12]Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1374 (2010).

[13] David Meyer, Europe 'Will Not Accept' Three Strikes in ACTA Treaty, ZDNET, Feb. 26, 2010, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/communications/0,1000000085,40057434,00.htm; Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REv. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1624813 ; Scott M. Fulton, III, Strongest Condemnation Yet of Anti-Counterfeiting, 'Three Strikes' from EU, BETANEWs, Mar. 10, 2010, http://www.betanews.com/article/Strongest-condemnation-yet-of-anticounterfeiting-three-strikes-from-EU/1268242864; Michael Geist, Joint European Parliament ACTA Transparency Resolution Tabled, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4848/ 125/ (Mar. 9, 2010) (providing the draft resolution that states that "in order to respect fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and the right to privacy, with full respect for subsidiarity, the proposed Agreement must refrain from imposing any so called 'three strikes' procedures, in full respect of the decision of Parliament on article 1. 1b in the (amending) Directive 2009/140/EC that calls to insert a new para 3 a to article 1 Directive 2002/21/EC on the matter of 'three strikes"').

[14] Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Current Negotiations by the European Union of an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 2010 0.J. (C 147) 1, 3.

[15] Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Callfor Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, I WIPO J. 75, 85 (2009).

[16] Commerce & Econ. Dev. Bureau, H.K. Special Admin. Region Government, Proposals For Strengthening Copyright Protection In The Digital Environment 6 (2009) P.5.

[17] Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable? , 13 VND. J. ENT. & TEcH. L. at 730 (2011) (citing Letter from James W Cicconi, AT&T executive, to Victoria Espinel (March 24, 2010)); Peter K Yu, 'The Graduated Response' (2010) 62(5) Florida Law Review 1399.

[18] William Patry, Moral Panics and The Copyright Wars 14 (2004); Christopher Mitchell, Comcast: Internet Access is Temporarily a Civil Right, HUIFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2011), http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/christopher-mitchell/comcast-internetaccess-i b 921608.html.

Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), af'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

[19] Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Callfor Copyright Law Makers-Is the "Graduated Response" a Good Reply?, I WIPO J. 75, at 86 (2009). (highlighting "the educational effect of the warnings").

[20]Belleville, Mike. "IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight over Online Piracy." Temple International & Comparative Law Journal, vol. 26, no. 2, Fall 2012, p. 305; Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REv. available at http://ssm.com/abstract-id=1565038 (manuscript at 4).

[21]Brett Schiff, Copyright Alert System: Six-Strikes and Forced Arbitration Might Not Be the Answer, 16 CARDOZOJ. Confller RESOL 909, 922 (2015).

[22] Steve Knopper, RIAA's Gaze Turns from Users to ISPs in Piracy Fight, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 19, 2008, http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/14844/94542.

[23] Matthew Sag, Piracy: Twelve Year-Olds, Grandmothers, And Other Good Targets For The Recording Industry's File Sharing Litigation, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 133, 133 (2006); Steve Ragan, RIAA Sues Hospitalized Girl-Court Issues Default Judgment, TECH. HERALD, Dec. 9 2008, http://www.thetechherald.com/article.php/200850/2592/RIAA-sueshospitalized-girl-court-issues-default-judgment.

[24] Anders Bylund, RLAA Sues Computer-Less Family, 234 Others, for File Sharing, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2006).

[25] WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARs 14 (2009); Howell Llewellyn, 'Three-Strikes' Off Anti-Piracy Agenda in Spain, BILLBOARD.BIZ, June 22, 2009, p.13 http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content display/industry/e3i8071 e0d9c25cb6b876d377 lfb7e3dl02; Andrew Orlowski, RIAA Sues the Dead, THE REGISTER, Feb. 5, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/05/riaasuesthe-dead/.

[26] Brett Schiff, Copyright Alert System: Six-Strikes and Forced Arbitration Might Not Be the Answer, 16 CARDOZOJ. CONFLler RESOL 909, 922 (2015); Serbin, Danielle. "The Graduated Response: Digital Guillotine or a Reasonable Plan for Combating Online Piracy." Intellectual Property Brief, vol. 3, no. 3, August 13, 2012, p. [vii]-52; Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Moss Suits, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 19, 2008); Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 910-23 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 658-98 (2005); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOzo L. REv. 331, 387-401 (2003);

[27] Lital Helman, When Your Recording Ageny Turns into an Agency Problem: The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA 49, 65 (2009); Rosie Swash, Filesharer Joel Tenenbaum Has Fine Reduced by 90%, GUARDIAN (London), July 12, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/ 2010/jul/12/filesharer-joel-tenenbaum.

[28] Olivier Bomsel, The Costs and Benefits of Graduated Response in Copyright Enforcement, http://www.barrysookman.com/2010/02/01/the-costs-and-benefits-of-graduatedresponse-in-copyright-enforcement/ (Feb. 1, 2010); Olivier Bomsel & Heritiana Ranaivoson, Decreasing Copyright Enforcement Costs: The Scope of a Graduated Response, REV. EcoN. RES. ON COPYRIGHT ISSUES, Dec. 2009, at 13,27.

[29] Mike Masnick, RJAA Spent $17 6M4illion In Laouuits... To Get $391,000 In Settlements, TEcHDIRT (Jul. 14, 2010, 09:44 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/ articles/20100713/17400810200.shtml.

Greg Sandoval, A Year Out, Where's RIAA's Promised ISP Help?, CNETNEWS, Dec. 23, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10420803-261.html.

[30] Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1887-88 (2000).

[31] Yu, Peter K. "The Graduated Response." Florida Law Review, vol. 62, no. 5, January 2010 , p. 1384.